Reflection, Pragmatism, Concets and Intuition by Lynch, Maureen & Metcalf, Mike
JITTA 
JOURNAL OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY THEORY AND APPLICATION 
Ken Peffers acted as the senior editor for this paper. 
Lynch M. and M. Metcalfe, “Reflection, Pragmatism, Concepts and Intuition,” Journal of Information 
Technology Theory and Application (JITTA), 7:4, 2006, 1-10. 
REFLECTION, PRAGMATISM, CONCEPTS AND INTUITION 
MAUREEN LYNCH, University of Adelaide 
Faculty of the Professions, Tel: 061 8 8303 7400, E-mail: maureen.lynch@adelaide.edu.au   
 
MIKE METCALFE, University of South Australia 
School of Management, Division of Business, Tel: 061 8 8302 0268, Fax: 061 8 8302 0512,  
E-mail: mike.metcalfe@unisa.edu.au   
ABSTRACT 
While there have been many calls to use reflection in information systems 
(IS) research, the intent of those who linked the word to inquiry, the pragmatists, 
seems to be unclear.  They suggested that sensory inputs (experiences) are 
reflected off specific concepts, either intuitively or explicitly. This paper argues 
that it may help to distinguish two types of reflection, ‘intuitive reflection’ and 
‘concept reflection’. The former involves reflection without an explicit and 
formal process of selecting and considering the concept (idea, stance) that is to 
be used to reflect on a past sensory experience. Explicit concept reflection 
involves selecting a specific concept against which to reflect. The reflection 
literature is revisited using this distinction. Without a clearer understanding of 
the pragmatic stance on thinking as re-viewing, the useful pluralist and 
emancipatory implications of using reflection are in danger of being missed. 
 
 
THE PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Numerous researchers call for 
reflection (Reynolds 1998; Kember et al 1999; 
Bjerknes 1992; Mathiassen and Purao 2002) 
without making clear what is to be reflected 
against what. Are we to reflect our sensory 
input against an ideal or are we to reflect 
against various conceptions of the world? The 
latter is very much the pragmatic intent when 
advocating reflection. This specific meaning of 
reflection is often not made clear, which 
means the powerful pragmatic inquiry method 
is not being fully exploited. This paper aims to 
re-emphasise the pragmatic intent and use this 
to revisit the reflection literature. It will do this 
by distinguishing between intuitive reflection 
and the explicit use of well defined concepts.  
INTUITIVE AND EXPLICIT CONCEPTS 
The pragmatist who wrote the most 
about reflection is Dewey (1910). He 
specifically argues that thinking starts with the 
reflection of sensory inputs (experiences) 
against some concept (ualisation); a 
comparison. Rigorous thinking starts with the 
reflection of sensory inputs against explicit 
concepts, self-consciously selected. Reflective 
thinking suggests a sequence of:  
• The need to make a choice, and the selection 
of one option. 
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• Recollection of experiences related to that 
option. These experiences are sensory inputs 
from past events, actions, or advice.  
• Comparison of those experiences 
(intuitively or explicitly) against some 
concept.  
• Consideration of the consequences of that 
option as highlighted by the particular 
concept used.   
One of Dewey’s examples involves 
choosing whether to take the train, bus or taxi 
to get to an appointment across town. He 
thinks of one option, say, the train, and selects 
the concept of ‘timeliness’ (arriving on time). 
He then reflects one against the other to 
highlight the consequences (logical sequence 
of events) of the option of taking the train. If 
that option is problematic he then goes through 
the sequence again with another option, say 
taking the bus. Interestingly, Polya, in his 
famous ‘How To Solve It’ (1945), suggests the 
same problem solving method. When stuck on 
a maths problem, look for concepts used to 
provide solutions to previous problems to see 
if any are useful with the new problem.   
Notice there are at least two important 
elements of this pragmatic act that need to be 
mentioned in this paper. The first is having 
some experience, be it from everyday work or 
from a controlled experiment. The second is 
reflecting against a particular concept, 
intuitively or in an explicit self-conscious 
manner. Pierce (1878) seems to argue there 
will be one best concept through which to 
reflect, but James (1907/1910) opens up the 
idea that the reflection will be more 
informative if a comparison were made with a 
range of concepts rather than just seeking one 
ideal. Using Dewey’s example of thinking 
about transport to get across town, past 
experiences might have been reflected upon 
using concepts like comfort, speed, fun, 
novelty or environmentally friendly. These 
concepts will suggest different choices of 
transport to get to his appointment.  
Dewey has obviously had an impact on 
information systems through his influence on 
Herbert Simon’s and Donald Schon’s work. 
However, his specific use of the term 
‘reflection’ to explain thinking may have been 
underestimated because it would appear that 
we can think without using explicit concepts 
against which to reflect. For example, we 
would appear to be able to think about, reflect 
on, a recent project without needing to first 
think about some concept to reflect against. 
Dewey’s response would be that this is wrong. 
We intuitively use concepts (or parts thereof) 
to reflect off when thinking; even though we 
may not be aware we are doing it. In the case 
of Dewey’s transport problem he may have 
‘intuitively’ chosen the concept of ‘timeliness’ 
over status, comfort or environmental 
responsibility. The rigorous thinker is aware of 
which concepts he or she is using to reflect.  
Intuitive concepts are thought to be 
similar to schemas, patterns, mental models, or 
automatic thinking as discussed in the 
psychological literature (Allport 1954) and 
perhaps like a priori as discussed in the 
philosophical literature. This subconscious 
application of a concept is thought to be so 
practised, that we do it without being aware. 
However, it is thought possible to make one 
aware of one’s subconscious choice. Our 
concerns, such as food, status, safety and 
friendship, may well provide some intuitive 
concepts. Others can be explicitly learnt like 
‘environmentally-friendly’, morality or 
‘project-management’. Language allows us to 
be encouraged to use alternative concepts.   
As an exercise, may we ask you to 
reflect on ‘organisations’. Intuitively you 
might think about the experience of your 
present place of employment and reflect on it 
using concepts of ‘status’, ‘power’ or 
CONTRIBUTION 
The contribution this paper makes to 
the IS community includes: 
• Providing a review of the reflection 
literature. 
• Reiterating the pragmatic intent when 
using the word ‘reflection’. Given the 
pragmatics were one of the main 
proponents of reflection, this seems 
appropriate. 
• Assisting those undertaking action 
research to ensure their reflection uses an 
explicit concept.  
• Providing supporting evidence to the 
argument that the classification of 
reflection into ‘intuitive’ and ‘explicit use 
of concepts’ is useful.  
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‘change’. Morgan, in ‘Images Of 
Organization’ (1986), used a range of explicit 
concepts that he, Pepper (1942) and Lakoff 
(1993) call conceptual metaphors. These 
include reflecting on organisations through the 
concepts of ‘machinery’, ‘adaptive organism’, 
‘systems’ and others. Their argument is that 
using these explicit concepts to reflect opens 
many more ideas about organisations. The 
wider management literature has used many 
other concepts such as core competency, 
competitive advantage, irony and strategy, to 
reflect on organisations.  
Importantly, pragmatic reflection has a 
particular understanding of how decisions are 
made (Dewey 1910, chp.6) which differs 
significantly from that which might be called 
the ‘traditional’ one associated with Herbert 
Simon (Newell and Simon 1972; Metcalfe 
2005; Gilbert 1991). The traditional one being 
that we observe a problem, remain neutral 
while collecting evidence in support of 
numerous alternative solutions and then we 
choose a solution. This would suggest for 
explicit concepts reflection, the task becomes 
one of appreciating a problem and then 
thinking about it using a range of different 
concepts until a useful one is found and using 
that to make a choice. Rather, Dewey’s 
reflective thinking means that, when we 
encounter a problem, our intuitive concepts 
will immediately suggest a solution. For 
example, when told users are not happy with a 
particular application, the intuitive concept of 
user training may be enacted and the intuitive 
solution generated of increased user training. 
Rigorous reflection then becomes one of using 
a range of explicit concepts to reflect on this 
intuitive solution. If this intuitive solution 
becomes untenable, then another intuitive 
solution will need to take its place and then the 
explicit concepts reflection process starts 
again. This pragmatic approach to decision 
making therefore makes maximum use of 
participants’ past experiences as these generate 
the intuitive solutions.  
To emphasise the distinctive approach 
of reflection in pragmatism, it may be useful to 
compare it to the alternative of Aristotle’s 
Causes. He suggests the system of questions 
which some readers will associate with 
Kipling’s six serving men (Hookins 2005).    
Cause of the Act 
(a) Why did it happen?  
(b) What (instruments) made it happen?  
(c) Who made it happen?   
(d) With what instruments?   
Circumstances of the Act 
(e) When did it happen? 
(f) Where did it happen? 
(g) How did it happen, in what manner?  
Result of the Act 
(h) What Happened?  
These are picked up in the modern 
reflection literature by Mezirow (1991). He 
reduces them down to three groupings which 
he renames as content reflection (what we 
did), process reflection (how we did it and 
how well we did it) and premise reflection 
(why we did it and the consequences).  
It could be said that Aristotle’s 
questions are calling for reflection. However, 
there is a significant difference in emphasis 
compared to Dewey’s point about reflecting 
off concepts. For example when asking ‘What 
happened’, there is no suggestion of what 
concept might be used to think about this 
question.  So using the example of the failure 
of the various Ambulance emergency services 
computerised systems (Flowers 1996), to ask 
the ambulance drivers what happen will get a 
different answer from asking the patients, the 
hospital administrators and the IT developers 
who will give intuitive reflections perhaps 
based on their professional training.  Each 
different answer may well be ‘true’ in its own 
right. Further, setting up a research project 
asking the same question using the concepts of 
leadership, systems evaluation, criminal 
activity and compassion will get different 
responses again. The same is true of all 
Aristotle’s questions. A pragmatist when 
asked, “What happened?” should respond, “I 
have an intuitive response (reflection) to that 
question but what concepts do you want me to 
use to reflect further?” 
ALTERNATIVE CLASSIFICATIONS OF 
REFLECTION 
It is being suggested here that it is 
useful to distinguish intuitive from explicit 
concept reflection to underline the pragmatic 
intent when calling for reflection. This 
includes Dewey’s view of thinking where all 
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thinking involves reflection between our 
sensory input (experiences) and some concept. 
If the concept is not explicitly appreciated by 
the thinker then, if understanding takes place, 
an intuitive one from past experiences must 
have been provided by our brains. This seems 
to assume differing levels of reflective 
competence. Some people seem competent 
enough to select the concept against which 
they reflect, while others reflect against 
concepts unawares. This differing ability is 
assumed to exist only until people are made 
aware that they can select alternative concepts 
against which to reflect.  
The human cognitive development 
researchers, like Piaget (1973) and Bateson 
(1973) have studied the development of our 
thinking skills during childhood.  Their 
research, and other mentioned below, seems to 
suggest that intuitive reflection may be present 
in children but explicit concepts reflection 
comes later in life, taking some years and 
effort to develop.   
The ability to see some event from 
someone else’s view apparently does not start 
until aged about seven or eight years. 
Arguably, this means the ability to use a range 
of concepts through which to reflect takes 
much longer for our brain to achieve. The 
necessity to lecture on double loop learning in 
University courses, and the observation of a 
lack of explicit concepts reflection in some 
middle aged people, support the argument that 
concepts reflection not only needs 
considerable cognitive skill, but it also needs 
explicit practice.  Personal experience of 
undergraduates’ responses when asked to 
compare how different professions might 
respond to a complex social problem 
reinforced this. The same is true of getting 
undergraduates to apply Morgan’s 
organisation metaphors to case studies. It can 
take some students a while to confine their 
reflections to one metaphor. An even more 
testing example comes from the experience of 
using the ‘random word’ brainstorming 
technique. With this, people are given a 
random word and asked to use it to reflect on 
some problem. For example, someone could 
be asked to use the randomly generated word 
‘elephant’ to reflect on the problem of 
designing an information system. Elephants in 
the context of IT make me think of long 
memory, cumbersome, family protection of 
the young, evaluation by being approached by 
numerous ‘blind’ people, destroying 
environments and being able to communicate 
over long distances outside the human audible 
range. The concept ‘elephant’ does seem to 
encourage a particular reflective stance.   
King and Kitchener (1994) seem to 
provide support for the intuitive/explicit 
pragmatic divide being argued for in this 
paper. They talk in terms of cognitive 
competence providing three main stages which 
they call  
• pre-reflective,  
• quasi-reflective and  
• reflective judgement.  
The quasi reflective stage would appear 
to be thinking that includes being able to see 
something from other people’s point of view, 
to use metaphors and methods like random 
word brainstorming. The latter, reflective 
judgement stage, is the ability to use explicitly 
a series of different concepts to interpret the 
same world events. While many people may 
achieve this final stage, there is expected to be 
a considerable range in people’s skills to 
perform these mental tasks. While lining up 
with the intent of pragmatic reflection, it does 
not emphasise the idea that a mentally 
developed person will be reflecting off 
concepts (even if only intuitively).  
Hatton and Smith (1995) contend that 
there are five developmental classifications of 
reflection, technical, descriptive, dialogic and 
critical, each with its own purpose and 
characteristics.  
Smyth (1986) describes technical 
reflection as being: 
characterised by the application or 
implementation of existing knowledge to 
the attainment of given ends. This is 
reflection of a technical-rational kind that 
culminates in instrumental action. (p. 18) 
It does not examine the social context, 
in fact, it takes the context for granted 
(Kemmis 1985). Technical reflection involves 
auditing the existing competencies and skills 
to assess their adequacy, in efficient 
completion of a given task using a set of given 
criteria for success. Hatton and Smith (1995) 
maintain that technical reflection is a crucial 
aspect for young professionals’ development 
and foundation for other forms of reflection.   
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Recognition that there are alternative 
(re)actions or paths possible to achieve some 
goal, and being able to justify the choice of 
one constitutes descriptive reflection (Hatton 
and Smith 1995). It is called ‘describing’ 
because of the ability to describe the process 
of deciding which action to take. Hatton and 
Smith (1995) report that descriptive reflection 
is often used by individuals to describe the 
context of the situation and the reasons, based 
on personal judgement, for taking that action. 
It is then used to build the next form of 
reflection. 
Dialogic reflection involves 
retrospective analysis of a situation or action, 
comparing the action taken with available 
alternatives and viewing the action from 
different frames. Pee et al (2002, p. 578) 
describe it as ‘a form of discourse with one’s 
self, mulling over reasons and exploring 
alternatives.’ Hatton and Smith (1995, pp. 49) 
assert that ‘such reflection is analytical or/and 
integrative of factors and perspectives and may 
recognise inconsistencies in attempting to 
provide rationales and critique’.  
Critical reflection ‘involves an analysis 
of power and control and an examination of 
the taken-for-granteds within which the task of 
problem is situated’ (Reynolds 1998). Critical 
reflection, considered the highest form of 
reflection (Hatton and Smith 1995; Stein 2000; 
Knight 1996; Raelin 2001), requires 
recognition of events through cultural, social, 
political and historical frames. Hatton and 
Smith (1995, pp. 35) describe critical 
reflection as:  
involving moral and ethical criteria, 
making judgements about whether 
professional activity is equitable, just and 
respectful of persons or not. In addition, 
critical reflection locates any analysis of 
personal action within wider socio-
historical and politico-cultural contexts. 
From the intent of pragmatic reflection, 
Hatton and Smith (1995) appear to be 
suggesting a development through the 
concepts being used to reflect. At first the 
concepts come from life’s social experiences 
from our families and friends particularly 
when growing up. Fairness and compassion 
are examples. Then some concepts are 
provided from scientific or professional 
education like measurement, efficiency and 
leadership. Then, in adult life, other concepts 
are appreciated like justice, equity, respect, 
loyalty and democracy. Exactly what order 
concepts become available to our minds would 
seem to depend on our upbringing and interest 
in engaging with the concerns of people 
different from ourselves.  
Mezirow (1991) points out that the 
nature of critical reflection requires there to be 
a ‘hiatus’ during which the analysis of one’s 
intuitive concepts takes place. Brookfield 
(1990) explains critical reflection is comprised 
of three stages: firstly, identification of one’s 
intuitive concepts; secondly, examination of 
those for validity and accuracy; and thirdly, 
reforming the concepts, taking into account 
issues highlighted in the scrutiny.  
Reynolds (1998, pp. 189) asserts that 
critical reflection has the following 
characteristics that differentiate it from the 
other forms of reflection:  
• It is concerned with questioning intuitive 
concepts… a process of making evaluations, 
often moral ones, and not simply using 
concepts of a practical, or technical nature.  
• Its focus is social rather than individual…the 
socially situated nature of intuitive concepts 
must be taken into account for reflection to 
have any meaning. 
• It pays particular attention to the concept of 
‘power’. Perhaps the most notable 
distinction of critical reflection is in terms of 
the attention paid to questioning relations 
between power and knowledge and the way 
even a person’s intuitive concepts is 
inevitably influenced by their position in 
hierarchies of power and privilege.  
• It is concerned with the emancipation 
concept.  
King and Kitchener (1994) argue that 
critical reflection is similar to, but not the 
same as, reflective judgment. They maintain 
that critical reflection requires a set of skills 
that can be learned from a limited set concepts 
such as power, ethics or emancipation, 
whereas reflective judgment requires creative 
development of a range of alternative and 
relevant concepts. They suggest it is necessary 
to work through the other stages of reflection 
before the concepts required for reflective 
judgment can be appreciated.   
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Although Stein (2000, pp. 1) claims 
that adults can learn to reflect using critical 
concepts if they are taught the processes: 
‘assumption analysis, contextual awareness, 
imaginative speculation and reflective 
scepticism’, he concurs with Hatton and Smith 
(1995) that the incidence of critical reflection 
in students in their studies and studies of 
others is very rare. Hatton and Smith (1995) 
found that, despite the methods used to 
promote the critical concepts, the majority of 
students remain using technical concepts. 
Techniques such as action research projects 
and journal writing, incorporating questions to 
trigger thought processes, have been proven to 
be successful in facilitating the explicit use of 
these technical and other non critical concepts 
for reflection (Hatton and Smith 1994; 
Mathiassen and Purao 2002). However, they 
argue that specialised skills in the educator and 
non-traditional educational processes are 
required if critical concepts are to be used with 
ease.  
Reflection on all levels is recognised as 
a learning concept. Critical reflection, with its 
focus on cultural, political and historical 
concepts, is considered essential to any 
information systems education to encourage 
developers to adopt inclusive, ethical work 
practices (Reynolds 1998; Hatton and Smith 
1995). However, the pragmatic intent does 
more than encourage use of critical concepts. 
It includes making people aware they can use 
alternative concepts to appreciate alternative 
truths. In this way they can improve the 
choices and so improve their lives. For 
example, the concept of ‘systems’ enlightened 
problem solvers locked into the ‘cause and 
effect’ concept.  
REFLECTION AND DOUBLE LOOP 
LEARNING 
The distinction between intuitive and 
explicit concepts reflection was made to 
overcome the feeling that reflection could be 
undertaken without using a concept against 
which to reflect. This clarification can now be 
used to re-interpret the double loop learning 
literature (Argyris and Schon 1996) to provide 
further explanation both of double loop 
learning and the pragmatic intent of reflection 
as always being against concepts. 
Mention of reflection to most readers 
will bring up thoughts of single-loop and 
double-loop learning (Jepsen, Mathiassen et al. 
1989; Knight 1996; Brockbank and McGill 
1998; Williamson and Iliopoulos 2001; 
Mathiassen 2002; Mathiassen and Purao 2002; 
McGill and Brockbank, 2004). So what is the 
relationship between these and the previously 
discussed intuitive and concepts reflection? It 
is thought that single loop reflection maps onto 
intuitive reflection. For example, Argyris and 
Schon, (1996) report single-loop reflection in 
the management context to mean evaluating 
past experiences only in terms of increased 
efficiency to reach a short term profit 
objective.  Management training makes 
consideration of efficiency and effectiveness 
intuitive in managers. Another example draws 
on Knight's (1996) explanation of single loop 
reflection using the question ‘are we doing 
things right?’. If this is answered with no 
discussion about what is meant by ‘right’ then 
only single loop reflection is occurring. Again 
it is thought that answering without asking 
what is meant by ‘right’ would be an intuitive 
answer, using the intuitive concepts of the 
respondent. Dooley (1999) uses the example 
of a buggy whip manufacturer in the early 21st 
century improving his processes in order to 
make finer buggy whips. Single loop reflection 
is when the manufacturer does not look 
beyond his immediate task to take into account 
the strategic changes occurring in transport. 
After many years making whips, he does not 
think through the concept of strategic change, 
but rather uses only the intuitive reflection of 
whip design efficiencies. Brockbank and 
McGill (1998) describe single-loop reflection 
in the context of higher education where 
perhaps single loop is like trade school 
training rather than the critical thinking 
required in a university course. Trade school is 
expected to teach the students to reflect 
intuitively on efficiency and effectiveness, 
while a critical education is expected to get 
students to question which concepts they are 
thinking through.  
There is a place for intuitive or single 
loop reflection. Knight (1996) argues that on 
occasions there is use for this type of reflection 
because of a need for ‘developing and 
improving the realisation of relatively fixed 
goals and objectives’ (Knight 1996, pp. 13). 
Courtney et al (1998) describe single loop as 
low-level reflection as it involves only keeping 
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to a set of rules and is simply error correction, 
but it is still viewed as valuable for day-to-day 
activities and is necessary for progress to be 
made within the established frameworks 
(Brockbank and McGill 1998).   
Double loop reflection is described by 
Argyris and Schon (1996) and Courtney et al. 
(1998) as a different type of reflection from 
single-loop. It incorporates the first loop with a 
second loop. In the language of this paper, this 
second loop centres on the evaluation of an 
experience using explicit and varied concepts. 
It recognises that evaluation of past actions 
and the resulting consequences identified 
through intuitive concepts alone may not be 
valid or extensive enough. Above in Dewey’s 
transport example, double loop reflection 
involved explicitly identifying concepts like 
‘comfort’ and the ‘environment’ and using 
these to evaluate the transport alternatives. 
Using Flood and Romm’s (1996) questions, 
double-loop learning would ask, ‘Are we 
doing things right AND are we doing the right 
things’. This paper is arguing that, in order to 
answer the second question, we need to reflect 
through a variety of different concepts. 
Mathiassen and Purao (2002) emphasise that 
double-loop reflection questions assumptions 
and values.  Mezirow (1991) and Weber 
(2003) maintain that double loop reflection 
necessitates taking into account one’s 
assumptions, biases and political influences 
when considering current beliefs and being 
prepared to challenge them, thereby being in a 
position to critique or evaluate with an open 
mind. Both of these also suggest the need for a 
range of concepts to highlight the assumption 
inherent in any one concept. The example of 
double-loop learning that Dooley (1999) gives 
is the occasion in the 1980s when Royal Dutch 
Shell delayed its intuitive plans for the 
acquisition of new oil fields when it foresaw 
the drop in oil prices and the demise of the 
Soviet Union. Scenario planning can be seen 
as an explicit exercise in shifting intuitive 
concepts to alternative explicit ones.  
Double loop learning would seem to 
suggest ‘standing outside of yourself’, or 
seeing the common place in a new light 
(Brockbank and McGill 1998). Using explicit 
concepts seems an obvious way of doing this 
systematically. Examples of explicit frames 
include the environment, global forces, and 
ethics. Put another way, we can switch from 
single loop to double loop by setting up a 
series of concepts through which to reflect. 
The first move from professional training to 
critical education may be to know when and 
how to activate this switch from intuitive to 
concepts reflection or from single to double 
loop learning.  
So, in summation, it appears that single 
and double loop reflection can be better 
explained by referring back to its pragmatic 
roots and the distinction between intuitive vs 
concepts refection. The advantage of doing so 
is to be clearer about distinguishing the two 
loops which, given the number of translations 
from Argyris and Schon’s original, suggests 
still causes problems with practitioners. 
Further, using the intuitive vs concepts 
language ties this reflection literature in with 
the pluralist and multiple perspective 
epistemologies and it also re-emphasises one 
of the principal intent of pragmatism, that of 
emancipating people world through useful 
concepts.   
REFLECTION IN OR ON ACTION 
At the start of this paper, it was 
suggested that there is a passage of time after a 
sensory experience before reflection and 
meaning is assigned. This passage of time may 
be a millisecond or many years. Intuitive 
reflection suggests a very small time period 
between the sensory experience (action) and 
the reflection to interpret the sensory input. It 
can be easily seen how evolution would select 
for this. There would be an advantage in being 
able to make a quick response to the sensory 
input of a predator. The threat would need to 
be very quickly reflected upon using the 
concept of predator. When there was some 
doubt, it would be better to use the predator 
concept intuitively, as the default. Reflection 
using explicit concepts seems like a luxury 
afforded only to those who can take some time 
over reflections. The reflection literature has 
long discussed this issue of timing, mentioning 
two or perhaps three different time bands.  The 
mainstream thought is that there are two main 
time bands (eg. Schon 1995) called reflection-
in-action and reflection-on-action. A third, 
prior, time band has been mentioned.  
Reflection-in-action is when reflecting 
and action take place almost simultaneously. 
Raelin (2001) calls it contemporaneous 
reflection. Hatton and Smith (1995) and Lee 
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and Sabatino (1998) suggest this short time of 
reflection, which requires the practitioner to 
draw on their knowledge almost 
simultaneously while executing the action, as 
difficult if anything but intuitive reflection is 
to be used. Schon (1995) suggests that 
reflection-in-action is scheduled into work 
practices so that it is almost routine and taking 
place alongside the work experience. It is 
unstructured, spontaneous reflection that takes 
place in real time. It is analogous to tacit 
knowledge, and single loop learning.  
However, when an unusual, unexpected 
or complex situation takes place, almost by 
definition, intuitive reflection no longer 
suffices; there is need to recognise the switch 
to using explicit concepts reflection, or 
reflection-on-action as Schon calls it. This 
necessarily comes distinctively after the action 
(Schon 1995; Mathiassen and Purao 2002). 
Smyth (1986) argues that technical reflection, 
which involves evaluation of the adequacy of 
skills and capabilities used for a particular 
task, usually takes place immediately after the 
event when the consequences are known; 
higher levels of reflection take place later. 
Smith and Lovat (1995) advise continuing 
reflection over a prolonged period of time after 
the action to ensure alternatives to the action 
taken are fully investigated.  
Reflection-on-action is often structured 
where actors are ‘coached’ through a series of 
activities (Seibert 1999) and learning and 
reflection are influenced by peers, supervisors 
or educators so that it ‘takes on a social 
dimension’ (Jarvinen et al. 2001, p. 288). 
Mezirow (1991, pp. 13) explains that this 
reflection requires a ‘hiatus’ between action 
and reflection ‘to reassess one’s meaning 
perspectives and, if necessary, to transform 
them.’ It is easy to see how concepts 
reflections, perhaps using innovative concepts, 
could be systematically applied as reflection-
on-action.  
Raelin (2001, pp. 19) argues for 
anticipatory reflection which occurs prior to 
the experience. This is analogous to reflecting 
on the future.  Dahlborn and Mathiassen 
(1995) and Mathiassen (2002) seem to support 
this by calling for reflection coming before the 
action of developing a new human activity 
system.  However, our reading of James 
(1907/1910) and Dewey (1910) is that it is 
impossible to reflect on something that has not 
been a past sensory experience. What will 
occur is the mind will assume a past sensory 
experience which is analogous to the future 
project and reflect on what it knows. This is 
remindful of the old adage that planning can 
only ever be like driving a car by looking 
through the mirror; trying to interpret the past 
so as to guess at the future. Reflecting on how 
analogous past projects are likely to be with 
the future, hopefully using a range of 
alternative concepts, does however seem 
useful.  
SUMMATION 
This paper has argued for the pragmatic 
intent of reflection. Pragmatism popularised 
reflection, but it has its own epistemology and 
ideology. This seems to have been repressed in 
much of the literature on reflection resulting in 
an exclusion of the pluralist dimension of 
reflecting so central to pragmatism. What is 
reflected off alters what is seen. Developing 
reflection skills becomes a matter of 
developing innovative concepts against which 
to reflect. Useful being defined as opening up 
alternative actions for people to take to 
improve their lives. For systems developers 
this means looking for concepts like systems 
thinking, critical social theory, e-commerce, 
knowledge management, self-organisation and 
mobility to think about the action of designing 
of useful information systems.  
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